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policy are important considerations in designing  protection is likely to involve reform of both
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and public expenditure policy.  For example:  reliance on efficiently designed user charges will
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A competitive real exchange rate, improved  internationally.
trade performance, and trade liberalization are
al  built on the base of sound fiscal management.  *  Correct priorities should be set for public
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however, have a negative effect on fiscal bal-  failing - to ensure that they are supportive of
ances, which must be considered and compen-  trade and of tradable goods production.
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Table 3  .19The  world  has seen  a substantial  slowdown  of economic  growth  in
recent  years. Industrial  economies  grew  at an average  rate  of  about  4 percent
per  annum  during  the  1960s  and  1970s,  and developing  countries  by  about  5.5
percent. For  the  1980s  the  growth  rates  for  these  two  country  groups  are
expected  to  average  only  about  2.5  percent  and  4 percent,  respectively.  For
Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  the  highly  indebted  countries,  the  1980s  have  even
brought  a sizable  decline  in  per  capita  incomes.
For the  developing  countries  changes  in  the  international  environment
are  a  major  factor  explaining  this  turn  of events. The  growth  of
international  trade  slowed  in the  1980s. Oil  prices  gyrated  widely. Non-oil
commodity  prices  slumped. Real interest  rates  reached  highs  unprecedented
after  World  War II. Access  to international  capital  became  severely
constrained  and  net  resource  transfers  turned  negative,  dramatically  so  after
1983.
The impact  of public  finance  and  trade  policies  in industrial
countries  on  developing  country  public  finances,  trade  and  development  is
direct  and  immediate:  growing  industrial  country  protection  reduces
developing  countries'  access  to  markets;  rising  agricultural  production
subsidies  in the  former  depress  commodity  export  prices  for  the  latter;  high
real  interest  rates  raise  the  current  account  and  budget  deficits  in  the
developing  world;  slow  industrial  country  growth  limits  tihe  growth  in trading
opportunities  for  the  developing  world. These  are  just  some  of the  most-2  -
important  linkages. One lesson  that  the  international  development  experience
in  recent  years  has  reinforced  is that  developing  countries  are substantially
influenced  by public  finance  and  trade  policies  in the  industrial  world.
This  dependence,  however,  can  be overstated.  Developing  countries,
to  a substantial  degree,  determine  their  own  economic  performance.  One
demonstration  of this  is the  differences  in trade  and  growth  performance  among
different  country  groups. Since  1970,  East  Asia  has  fared  best  in  performance
of both  purchasing  power  of exports  and  export  volume,  both  for  non-oil
commodity  exports  and for  manufactured  exports. Latin  America  and  South  Asia
were  less successful,  while  Sub-Saharan  Africa  fared  consistently
worst  [28]. Much  of this  difference  in trade  and  development  performance  must
be  attributed  to the  cumulative  impact  of different  policies  pursued  over  the
last  two  to three  decades  in  these  country  groups,  including  trade  and  public
finance  policies.
The  linkages  b-tween  trade  policy  and  development  performance  have
been  much studied  and  documented  [4]  [121  [26]. Similarly,  the  links  between
public  finance  policies  and  development  have  been  discussed  in the  literature
(7]  [28].  What  has  not  been  explored  systematically  are  the  linkages  and
interdependence  among  public  finance  and  trade  policies  as they  jointly
influence  the  development  performance  of developing  countries. These
interrelationships  are  of  more than  academic  interest. Neglect  of the  public
finance  dimension  in the  design  of trade  volicy  reform,  and  vice  versa,  may
well  result  in  policies  that  are inconsistent  with  major  policy  goals  or
unsustainable  over  time. For  example,  in  the  Philippines  a  major  trade  policy
reform  was initiated  in  the  early  1980s,  but  had  to be  halted  and  even
partially  reversed,  when  the  country  was  hit  by  economic  crisis  in the  mid-
1980s,  largely  as a result  of unsound  fiscal  policies.-3-
Using  public  finance  policy  as the  point  of departure,  this  paper
will explore  the  interdependence  between  public  finance  and trade  policies  and
its  significance  for  development  in three  dimensions  of policy  design:
macroeconomic  policy,  public  revenue  policy,  and  public  expenditure  policy.
The paper  does  not  address  questions  of political  economy. In this  area,  past
mistakes  in  policy  design  were  due to  lack  of recognition  of interactions
among  multiple  policy  objectives  and interest,  as much  as they  were  due to
decision  makers'  unwillingness  to take  appropriate  action. The  first  step
needed  in  policy  analysis  is therefore  to assess  the  importance  of
interactions  and  their  normative  implications  for  policy  design. That is  the
purpose  of the  remainder  of this  paper.
The  Macroeconomic  Dimension: Fiscal  Policy  and  Trade
Countries  have reacted  differently  to the  external  shocks  of the  past
two  decades. In those  -ountries  that  have  been  successful  in  avoiding  crisis,
stable  real  exchange  rates,  sound  fiscal  management,  and  a  movement  toward
trade  liberalization  have  played  a vital  role.
The  Exchange  Rate.  The  main link  between  fiscal  policy  and trade  is
the  exchange  rate.  Generally,  excessive  fiscal  deficits  are  at the  root  of
overialued  exchange  rates. As fiscal  deficits  increase,  additional  pressure
on domestic  demand  drives  wages  and  prices  up.  Overreliance  on money  creation
for  financing  the  deficit  also  results  in  inflation. Increased  domestic
prices  relative  to the  prices  in  a country's  trading  partners  lead  to
____overvaluation  in the  real  exchange  rate. To the  extent  the  excess  demand
spills  over into  an increased  current  account  deficit,  the  higher  capital
flows  that  finance  this  deficit  will  underwrite  the  currency's-4  -
overvaluation.  Overvaluation  favors  the  production  of non-tradables  over that
of tradables,  whether  exports  or import  substitutes,  and is  reflected  in a
loss  of  competitiveness  in international  markets. As a result,  export
performance  deteriorates.  In the  long  run,  overvaluation  also  leads  to a fall
in  investment  in  the  tradable  goods  sector. This  dampens  the  country's
ability  to  export  even  further.
Governments  often  put  off  devaluation,  in  many  cases  for  political
reasons. Instead  they  turn  to  "temporary  measures"  such  as import  duties  and
quantitative  restrictions  on imports  (QRs)  as a  means  of stabilizing  the
current  account. Politically  such  measures  often  satisfy  increasing  demands
for  protection  but, in  fact,  these  measures  merely  reinforce  the  distorting
effects  of overvaluation.  In  addition,  protection  tends  to  lead  to "rent
seeking"  where  resources  are  spent  capturing  the  rents  that  result  from  the
restrictive  measures,  rather  than  pursuing  productive  activities  [5]  [111
(261. Such  a diversion  'of  resources  has  additional  costs  for  the  economy.
Eventualiy,  overvaluation  of the  currency  will become  unsustainable
and  the  government  will  be forced  to devalue. However,  devaluation  of the
currency  without  accompanying  fiscal  and  monetary  restraint  is  usually
fruitless.  Continued  excess  dumand  and  inflation  erode  the  initial  effect  of
devaluation  on the  real  exchange  rate. Only  a devaluation  combined  with
fiscal  and  monetary  adjustment  lends  itself  to a sustainable  improvement  in
competitiveness.  1V
Sound  Fiscal  Management. Fiscal  restraint  does  not  necessarily  imply
a balanced  budget. Rather,  it involves  a deficit  or surplus  that  is
consistent  with  other  macroeconomic  objectives  such  as controlling  inflation,
promoting  private  investment,  and  maintaining  external  creditworthiness.  A-5-
country  with  a  high level  of savings  and  an efficient  economy,  such  as  Korea,
can  support  a  higher  deficit  than  a country  with  a lower  savings  level  and  a
less  efficient  production  process,  such  as the  Philippines.
The  effect  of a fiscal  deficit  depends  not  only  on its  size,  but  also
on  how it is  financed. Fiscal  deficits  mn*,  be financed  either  domestically  or
externally.  Domestically,  a deficit  can  be financed  either  by borrowing  in
the  private  sector  or by creating  money. A government's  ability  to borrow
from  the  private  sector  depends  upon  both  the  sophistication  of financial
markets  and  upon  the  willingness  of private  investors  to  hold  government
bonds. Government  borrowing  from  the  private  sector  will tend  to  reduce  the
credit  available  to private  borrowers,  and  lead  to a rise  in interest  rates
and  a  decline  in investment.  An extended  reduction  in  private  investment
reduces  the  growth  and international  competitiveness  of the  economy.
To a limited  extent,  a government  in  a growing  economy  can finance
itself  by expanding  the,money  base  without  causing  inflation,  as long  as the
rate  of growth  of the  money  supply  does  not  exceed  the  growth  of the  demand
for  money. However,  when the  rate  of  new  money  creation  exceeds  the  growth  in
demand  for  money,  inflation  will  occur. In  most  developing  countries,
inflation  is  a fiscal  phenomenon,  caused  by a government  financing  a deficit
by  monetary  creation  at a higher  rate  than  the  growth  in  money  demand. At the
same  time,  inflation  has  a fiscal  effect. As the  real  value  of money  holdings
falls  with inflation,  individuals  are  subject  to an implicit  "inflation
tax." Beyond  a certain  point,  however,  an increase  in  money  creation  and thus
in the  rate  of inflation  may  actually  decrease  the  government's  claim  to
resources  if  high inflation  causes  the  demand  for  currency  to  drop  sharply.
Inflation  also tends  to increase  government  expenditures  and reduce  its  real-6-
revenue  growth  (the  "Tanzi"  effect). This  further  increases  the  deficit,  and
has in  some  countries  led  to a vicious  inflationary  spiral  (e.g.,  Argentina,
Bolivia,  and  Brazil).
As mentioned  above,  inflation  associated  with  fiscal  imbalances  and
overreliance  on money  creation  will--where  exceeding  that  of major  trading
partners--lead  to  an overvaluation  of the  exchange  rate  with  all  the  negative
effects  that  such  an overvaluation  has  on trade. Inflation  will  also  create
uncertainty  regarding  input  prices  as well  as increasing  product  prices. All
of  these  factors  lead  to  reduced  creditworthiness  and  an uncertain  policy
environment,  which  in  turn  can  lead  to  reduced  investment  and  capital
flight. Producers  will  back  away  from  the  production  of tradable  goods  as the
cost  increases  (due  to  lower  investment)  and  profits  diminish  (due  to  the
overvalued  exchange  rate).
Another  possibility  for  financing  a government  deficit  is  to  borrow
externally.  The  danger,  of excessive  reliance  on foreign  borrowing  are  well
demonstrated  by the  experience  of the  highly  indebted  countries. When
creditworthiness  is lost,  access  to foreign  finance  suddenly  becomes  extremely
limited,  requiring  a substantial  reduction  in  current  account  deficits.  In
the  short  term  this  can  usually  only  be achieved  by  a drastic  cut  in
imports. On average,  import  volumes  declined  6.2  percent  per  annum  between
1980  and  1987  in the  highly  indebted  countries  (25]. When  combined  with
cutbacks  in  domestic  investment,  import  compression  limits  a country's
flexibility  in responding  to improved  trading  opportunities  on the  export
side. In extreme  cases,  when  creditors  fail  to reach  agreement  with  debtors
on repayment  terms,  an interruption  or higher  cost  of commercial  trade  finance
can  result,  seriously  impeding  trade  for  the  country  concerned.- 7  -
In countries  that  experience  sudden  increases  in their  government
revenue,  often  due  to a boom  in the  price  of a single  export  commodity,  proper
management  of the  surplus  is  as important  as effective  management  of a
deficit. Such  commodity  booms  have  occurred  in all  of the  oil-exporting
countries,  in  Colombia,  the  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Kenya,  and  many  others. In
practice,  governments  have  often  made  poor  use  of the  increase  in  public  funds
by increasing  recurrent  spending  or low-return  investments.  Real  exchange
rates  then  appreciate  excessively  and  exports  of goods  other  than  the  boom
commodity  decline. Import  growth  is  accelerated  due  to increased  aggregate
demand  and  overvalued  exchange  rates. During  the  boom,  export  revenues  and
capital  inflows  lead  to a surge  in  central  bank  holdings  of foreign  exchange
reserves. This in turn,  when  not fully  sterilized,  leads  to  rapid  monetary
growth  and  higher  inflation. Finally,  many  countries  have  used  their  enhanced
credit  worthiness  to  heavily  borrow  abroad  during  the  boom,  only  to  face  an
unsustainable  external..'ebt  position  when  commodity  revenue  drops  off.  The
lesson  to draw  is that  it is  often  better  to  err  on the  side  of  caution  by
limiting  domestic  use  of boom  revenues. By  using  increased  revenues  ti reduce
external  debt,  it is possible  to limit  the  appreciation  of the  exchange  rate
and thus  to support  a diversifLed  export  structure  and  greater  resilience  to
external  shocks  in the  longer  term. Nigeria  and  Mexico  are  countries  which
did  not  manage  their  booms  well;  Botswana  and Indonesia,  on the  other  hand,
have  avoided  economic  crisis,  demonstrating  that  sound  fiscal  management  is
indeed  possible.
Trade  liberalization.  The  experience  of a  number  of countries  has
highlighted  the  importance  of sound  fiscal  policies  to  the  success  of trade
liberalization  [12]  [141  (16]. In  the  East  Asian  NICs,  liberalization  has- 8 -
been  able  to succeed  partly  because  of stable  fiscal  policies. By contrast,
poor  management  of the  fiscal  deficit  has  hindered  liberalization  attempts  in
many  other  countries. A general  conclusion  that  one  can  draw is  that  the
first  response  to  an economic  crisis  should  be  a prompt  and  well formulated
stabilization  program  to  ensure  that  macroeconomic  imbalances  are  sufficiently
reduced  prior  to undertaking  trade  liberalization.  The  key  elements  of such  a
stabilization  program  are  devaluation  of the  exchange  rate  and reduction  in
the fiscal deficit.  A rapid response to macroeconomic imbalances is  necessary
to create  an environment  conducive  to structural  reforms  that  will  promr
economic  growth  and  trade  in the  long  run.
In the  short  term,  measures  to reduce  the  fiscal  defici4t  will  often
involve  reducing  demand  (particularly  demand  for  imports)  through  public
expenditure  cuts.  Later,  as quotas  and  tariffs  are  lowered  in  the  process  of
liberalization,  policies  to broaden  t!ie  tax  base  and  make  up for  lost  revenues
may  have  to be implemen.ed  to  keep fiscal  deficits  manageable.  For  the
countries  where  trade  taxes  are  an important  source  of revenue,  liberalization
is particularly  difficult  precisely  because  the  loss  in  revenue  conflicts  with
the  need  for  macroeconomic  stability.
In sum,  it is  essential  to  recognize  the  interrelationships  among
fiscal  policy,  the  exchange  rate,  and trade  policy. Sound  management  of
fiscal  policy  is  a priority  not  only  for  maintaining  internal  balance  but  for
promoting  external  balance,  a stable  exchange  rate,  and  long-term  trade
performance.  At the  same  time,  trade  policy  and  external  trade  and  exchange
rate  shocks  have  significant  effects  on fiscal  balance  and  macroeconomic
stability.- 9  -
Public  Revenue  and  Trade
Tax  policy  and trade  policy  are  highly  interrelated.  Import  tariffs
both  raise  revenue  and  protect  domestic  production  of import  substitutes.
Taxes  on exports  are  often  used  to tax  agricultural  and  rural  producers.
Special  fiscal  incentives  are  employed  to  promote  exports. Even  user  charges
can  have some  bearing  on trade. This  section  reviews  the  interaction  between
public  revenue  and  trade  policy  in  each  of these  areas.
Raising  Revenue. Developing  countries,  and  the  low-income  countries
in particular,  rely  on trade  tariffs  to a  much  greater  extent  than  do
industrial  countries. In 1985,  as a percentage  of total  tax  revenue,  import
and  export  taxes  provided  about  36 percent  of total  revenue  in the  low-income
countries,  18  percent  in the  middle-income  countries,  and  about  2  percent  in
the  industrial  countries. Import  and  export  taxes  represented  roughly
7 percent  of GDP in  the  low-income  countries,  6 percent  of GDP  in the  middle-
income  countries,  and  urder  0.5  percent  of GDP in the  industrial  countries
(see  Table  1).
Taxing  imported  and  exported  goods  provides  a straightforward  means
of raising  revenue  in  economies  where  tax  handles  are  limited. The
administrative  ease  with  which  trade  taxes  can  be collected  mckes  such  taxes
an attractive  alternative  when  administrative  capabilities  are  low. A recent
study  cites  the  administrative  costs  of trade  and  excise  taxes  as normally
ranging  from  1  to 3 percent  of revenue  collected  (compared  to  up to 5 percent
for  value  added  taxes  and  up to  10 percent  for  personal  income  taxes  [28]).
Trade  taxes,  particularly  import  duties,  also  have  the  advantage  of being
quickly  activated. In countries  where  the  urgency  of cutting  the  deficit
mounts,  such  taxes  are  often  used  as "quick  fixes"  to  a rising  budget  deficit.- 10  -
Table  1:  Trade  Taxation  as  a  Percentage  of  GDP and  as a Percentage
of Total  Tax Revenue, 1975,  1980,  and  1985  a/
1975  1980  1985
Trade  Taxes/CDP
Import  Taxes
Low-incuAe  countries  4.46  3.68  5.12
Middle-Lncome  countries  3.36  3'99  5.90
Industrlal  countries  0.85  0.62  0.35
Export  Taxes
Low-income  countries  1.49  1.16  1.12
MLddle-Lncome  countries  0.66  0.57  0.36
Industrial  countrles  0.05  0.02  0.01
Trade  Taxes/Total  Tax Revenue
Impo-:t  Taxes
Low-income  countries  25.17  27.67  28.50
Middle-incows  countries  20.23  20.06  17.04
Induatrial  countries  3.71  2.61  1.58
Export  Taxes
Low-Lncome  countries  11.40  10.18  7.99
Middle-income  countrles  3.94  3.08  1.30
Industrial  countries  0.24  0.13  0.04
Memorandum  Items
Total Tax/CDP
Low-Lncome  countries  14.40  14.90  14.60
Middle-income  countrles  17.80  19.00  20.00
Industrial  countrles  27.50  29.60  31.60
Domestic  Income/Total  Tax Revenue
Low-Lncome  countries  28.34  26.70  25.69
Mlddle-Lncome  countrLes  30.43  30.31  32.30
Industrial  countries  34.94  35.34  35.26
Other Direct/Total  Tax Revenue  b/
Low-Lacome  countries  3.13  2.88  2.69
Middle-Lncome  countrles  14.63  12.87  13.80
Industrlal  countries  31.50  31.67  32.41
Domestic  Commodity/Total  Tax Revenue
Low-income  countries  28.04  30.29  32.07
Middle-income  countrles  26.61  28.85  31.00
Industrial  countries  28.53  29.00  29.41
a/  Central  govermuent  only.  unweighted  averages.  CountrLes  are grouped
according  to the classifications  In  (281.
b/  Other direct Includes  property  tax and aocial  security.
Sources  IMF.  Covernment  Flnance  StatLatLes,  1987  and World bank data.- 11 -
While  the  administrative  costs  of implementing  trade  taxes  are low,
the  economic  cost  of increasing  trade  taxes  is  generally  higher  than  that  of
increasing  domestic  taxes. A 3tudy  by Clarete  and  Whalley  [61  compared  the
economic  cost  of trade  taxes  to the  economic  cost  of domestic  taxes  in  the
Philippines,  The study  concluded  that  the  marginal  economic  cost  of raising
revenue  using  trade  taxes  substantially  exceeds  that  of indirect  (or
commodity)  taxes,  especially  for  h;gher  rates  (see  Table  2).  Although  costs
of  distortion  vary  from  country  to country,  other  studies  (on  India,  Kenya,
and  Pakistan)  suggest  similar  results  [11  [2]  [281.
The  streamlining  of customs  procedures  can  reduce  the  costs  of
raising  revenue  with tariffs  and  help  improve  trade. Indonesia  brought  in  a
Swiss  firm  to streamline  the  assessment  and  collection  of its  customs
duties. While  such  measures  make  trade  taxes  less  costly,  they  cannot
compensate  for  the  underlying  difference  between  the  cost  of raising  revenue
through  trade  taxes  and that  of raising  revenue  through  domestic  commodity
taxes.
Table  2.  Marginal  Economic  Costs  of  Raising  Revenue  from  Trade  Tariffs
and  Domestic  Commodity  Taxes  in  the  Philippines
Tax  or  Marginal  economic  cost
Tariff  Rate  (pesos  per  peso  of revenue  raised)
(percent)  Trade  Tariffs  Domestic  Commodity  Taxes
10  0.46  -0.04
15  0.74  0.00
20  1.22  0.03
25  2.25  0.07
Source: Clarete  and  Whalley  1987,  [6].- 12 -
Protecting  Domestic  Production  through  Tariffs. In  many  countries
trade  taxes  are seen  as an important  tool  for  protecting  and  increasing
domestic  production  in import  substituting  industries.  Import  tariffs  are
also  often  imposed  in  response  to  a balance  of payments  crisis  in  order  to
reduce  the  amount  of imports. However,  import  tariffs  result  in  an implicit
tax  on exports. An increase  in tariffs  tends  to  result  in  an exchange  rate
appreciation  or substitute  for  a needed  depreciation.  Since  resources  move
into  the  production  of non-tradable  goods  at the  expense  of production  of
exports,  higher  tariffs  on imports  will tend  to  worsen  a balance  of payments
crisis  in  the  long  term.
Import  taxes  are  also  seen  as a way  to reduce  vulnerability  to a
harsh  or risky  external  environment.  While  import  tariffs  may reduce  a
country's  dependence  on imports  of final  consumption  goods,  they  frequently
lead  the  country  to be  highly  dependent  on the  remaining  imports  of
intermediate  goods  whic.  are  often  essential  for  domestic  production.  In the
end,  the  country  may be  as vulnerable  (if  not  more)  to fluctuations  in  export
earnings  because  the  remaining  imports  are  essential  to a large  part  of
domestic  production. If these  imports  cannot  be financed,  production  must be
severely  curtailed. In  addition,  whatever  benefit  there  may  be in terms  of
reduced  volatility  in the  balance  of payments  as  a result  of the  reduced
dependence  on trade,  this  will  be countered  by  greater  uncertainty  in  tax
revenues  as trade  taxes  will  amount  to  a larger  share  of total  revenues.
The  protective  effect  of trade  tariffs  is  not  fully  measured  by
nominal  tariff  rates  applied  at the  border. Tariffs  are  protective  only  to
the  extent  that  they  are  higher  than  domestic  indirect  taxes  on import
substitutes.  In fact,  the  combined  protective  effect  of tariffs  and  domestic- 13  -
taxes  on inputs  and  output  is  what  matters  for  any  particular  activity;  this
effect  can  be  measured  by calculating  the  "effective  rate  of protection
(ERP). While  many  problems  exist  in  calculating  and  interpreting  ERPs,  they
provide  at least  a benchmark  for  assessing  the  level  of protection  of various
sectors  in an  economy  and  for  tracking  changes  in the  joint  protective  effects
of tariffs  and  domestic  taxes,  especially  at times  when  trade  liberalization
policies  are  being  pursued.
Trade  liberalization  generally  involves  two  major  steps: first,
replacing  quantitative  restrictions  by tariffs  which  increases  revenues  and
thus  improves  the  overall  fiscal  balance;  second,  reducing  tariffs,  especiaLU
those  at the  higher  end  of the  spectrum,  which  tends  to lower  revenues--
although  the  reduction  in  smuggling  and  the increases  in  imports  tend  to
reduce  or even  reverse  this  negative  effect. A third  step  has  often  been
recommended  as a  way to reduce  the  dispersion  of  ERPs  for  different  activities
while  ameliorating  revezue  losses: raising  the  tariff  rates  at the  low  end  of
the  spectrum  (generally  tariffs  on intermediate  and  primary  inputs).
This  third  step  has  recently  been  questiooed  since  it creates
additional  distortions  (especially  against  exports)  and  vested  interests,.
which  may  be difficult  to  reverse  later  [211. As an alternative,  it is
recommended  that  tariff  reform  be integrated  with the  reform  of  domestic
commodity  taxes. Ideally,  a domestic  consumption  tax  (e.g.,  a value-added
tax)  should  be increased  at the  same  time  as tariffs  on final  products  are
lowered  with  the  eventual  goal  of eliminating  the  bias  in  favor  of import
substitution.  There  is considerabLe  merit  in  this  argument. It stresses  the
need  for  a comprehensive  public  finance  perspective  when  designing  a program
of trade  liberalization.  This  perspective  is important  not  only  because  of- 14 -
the  need  to  minimize  distortions,  but  also in  the  interest  of ensuring  that
the  revenue  effects  of trade  liberalization  do not  lead  to  a reversal  of the
liberalization  effort,  as was  the  case in  Thailand  in the  mid-1980s. Of
course,  there  are  cases  where  an introduction  of,  or increases  in  domestic
consumption  taxes  may  not  be readily  feasible,  or  where  raising  some  (if  not
all)  of the  low  tariffs  may  appropriately  support  the  development  of infant
industries,  especially  in the  intermediate  or capital  goods  sectors.
Nonetheless,  such  a conclusion  can,  and  should,  be  only  arrived  at after
considering  the  broader  fiscal  reform  options  in connection  with trade
liberalization.  What is  more,  protection--when  it is  granted--should  strictly
be limited  in  time  and size.
Export  taxes. The  use  of  export  taxes  has  declined  over  the  past  ten
years. In 1985  about  8 percent  of total  tax  revenue  in  the  low  income
countries  came  from  export  taxes  (the  figures  for  the  middle  income  and
industrial  countries  ar-  about  1 percent  and  less  than  .05  percent,
respectively;  see  Table  1).  Export  taxes  are  a means  of taxing  agricultural
and  rural  producers  who  are  difficult  to  reach  through  income  or land  taxes.
In  addition  to  raising  revenue,  export  taxes  hold  the  domestic  price  of  export
commodities  down  and  thus  offer  an  advantage  to local  processing  [7].
Multiple  exchange  rates  and/or  the  price  setting  activities  of  marketing
boards  such  as the  Cocoa  Board  in  Ghana  can  also  act  as implicit  export  taxes
by setting  domestic  prices  below  border  prices.
Evidence  on the  level  of taxation  suggests  that  in  some  countries
producers  of agricultural  exports  may  be overtaxed. For  example,  a
calculation  for  a typical  cocoa  farmer  in  Ghana  in the  early  1980s  reveals
that  an export  tax  of 4 percent  of the  farmers'  farmgate  price  would  have- 15  -
yielded  as much revenue  as if farmers'  profits  had  been  subject  to income  tax
at the  prevailing  rate. The  actual  export  tax,  however,  was  more  than  100
percent. To the  extent  that  export  taxes  are intended  to substitute  for
income  tax,  rates  could  have  been  greatly  reduced  [28].
In an economy  that  can  influence  the  international  price  of a
commodity,  export  taxes  lead  to  an increase  in prices  and  to improved  terms  of
trade. In practice,  few  countries  have  such  pricing  power,  especially  in the
long  run,  an?  the  export  tax  is shifted  back  onto  the  producers. As  a result,
export  taxes  discourage  the  production  of export  crops  and  may  lead  to  a
worsening  of the  current  account. Finally,  export  taxes  are  a highly
distortionary  means  of supporting  domestic  processing  industries.  To the
extent  such  support  is  thought  desirable,  other  instruments  (e.g.,  direct
subsidies)  would  be preferable  on economic  grounds. Export  taxes  should  thus
be used  only  very selectively  and should  be phased  out  as the  domestic  tax
base  broadens.
Export  Incentives.  In  order  to offset  the  anti-export  bias  inherent
in  their  tax  structures,  many  countries  employ  special  export  incentives.  One
of the  most successful  examples  of export  promotion  policies  are  those  of
Korea. In  many  other  developing  countries,  the  success  of these  programs  has
been  mixed.
Special  export  incentives  are  defended  on the  grounds  that  they  play
a transitional  role in  offsetting  disincentives  to  export  while  distortions  in
the  import  regime  are  gradually  reduced. It is  also  argued  that  promoting
exports  has important  externalities  in developing  marketing  skills,  the  .
transfer  of information,  and infrastructure.  These  externalities  may justify
government  intervention  in the  promotion  of exports  (4].  Nevertheless,  as- 16  -
there  are  also  costs  to public  intervention,  one  needs  to  be reasonably  sure
that  these  costs  are  outweighed  by the  benefits  of export  promotion.
In the  use  of tax  policy  for  export  promotion,  one  common  approach  is
to provide  duty  exemptions  and  indirect  tax  rebates. This  ensures  that
exporters  can  gain  access  to inputs  and trade  their  outputs  at world  market
prices. Other  instruments  of export  promotion  include  income  tax  rebates,
preferential  access  to  export  finance  for  exporters,  access  to  primary  and
non-traded  inputs  at undistorted  prices,  development  of institutional
infrastructure  for  trade,  and  in some  cases  the  use  of Free  Trade  Zones
(FTZs)  (20]. Efforts  have  been  made  in a  number  of developing  countries  in
recer-  Tears  to improve  the  coverage  and  administration  of the  export
incentives  [4].
The  danger  inherent  in  export  promotion  policies  is that  they  turn
attention  away  from  general  trade  policy  reforms.  Special  export  incentives
may  also  be  problematic  in  countries  with large  budget  deficits  and  low
administrative  capacity--since  effective  export  promotion  requires  some
spending  and  some  revenue  loss,  and  a strong  and  speedy  administrative
organization.  In  Thailand,  for  example,  it  has  been  estimated  that  an
effective  rebate  scheme  for  taxes  on export  production  would  imply  a revenue
loss  of between  0.3  and  0.6  percent  of GDP (4].  An additional  problem  with
export  promotion  policies  is that  they  are  increasingly  being  circumscribed  by
international  and  bilateral  rules  which  limit  the  accepted  forms  of
intervention.  Finally,  export  incentives  may  also  complicate  the  tax
structure  and  lead  to  the  buildup  of another  group  of special  interests  that
may  consequently  discourage  further  trade  reforms. Ultimately,  therefore,  it
would  be preferable  to  ai.m  for  tariff  reduction,  accompanied  by the- 17 -
introduction  of a  value-added  tax  (VAT). VAT  (when  based  on the  destination
principle)  automatically  does  what  export  tax  rebate  schemes  try  to do:
ensure  that  exports  are  not  burdened  by domestic  indirect  taxes.
Despite  its  limitations,  export  incentives,  when  properly  structured
and set  up to complement  rather  than  replace  overall  reform  of the  trade
regime,  can  play  an important  role  in  the  early  stages  of trade
liberalization,  when  much  depends  on ensuring  that  biases  against  production
of exportables  are  quickly  and  substantially  reduced.
User  Charges. Besides  taxes,  user  charges  for  publicly  provided
goods  and  services  (such  as  water,  power,  and  telecommunications)  are  a
promising  source  of public  revenue. In  fact,  if  they  are  set  to equal
marginal  costs,  they  are  preferable  to  taxes  since  they  not  only  raise
revenues  but  also  do not interfere  with  the  efficiency  of resource
allocation. How  do user  charges  affect  trade?
First,  conside-  the  level  of user  charges. Where,  as is commonly  the
case,  user  charges  do not  cover  financial  cost,  public  services  tend  to
deteriorate  and  the  rate  of improvement  in service  coverage  and  quality  will
be limited  for  lack  of financial  resources. Because  trade  and  tradable  goods
production  depend  on ready  access  to infrastructure  (see  below),  this  effect
of low  user  charges  will  have  a direct  bearing  on trade. Moreover,  when
financed  from  taxes,  infrastructure  subsidies  imply  additional  distortions  in
the  economy. To the  extent  that  higher  user  charges  imply  a reduction  in
subsidies,  they  lower  the  amount  of taxes  that  must  be raised. In countries
where  trade  taxes  are  an important  share  of the  tax  structure,  reducing  the
revenue  burden  by increasing  the  role  of user  charges  may  also  allow  a
reduction  in trade  taxes. This  will lessen  the  anti-export  bias  that  trade
taxes  imply  and  will  assist  trade  liberalization.- 18  -
Second,  there  is  the  question  of the  structure  of user  charges. In
many  countries,  industrial  users  of infrastructure  tend  to  be taxed  while
residential  users  are  subsidized.  Table  3  provides  some  data  on power  tariffs
in a  number  of developing  countries. Industrial  tariffs  exceeded  residential
tariffs  by roughly  4 to 145  percent  even  though  differences  in the  underlying
marginal  costs  of production  would,  if  anything,  go in  the  opposite
direction. Miore  research  needs  to be carried  out  to establish  the  precise
level  of taxation  implicit  in  these  figures,  but  they  do provide  prima  facie
evidence  of a bias  against  industrial  producers  in  the  structure  of user
charges,  a bias  which  reduces  the  competitiveness  of domestic  producers  in
international  markets.
Summing  up this  brief  review  of public  revenue  and trade  policies,
one  can  conclude:
1.  Many  developing  countries  rely  on trade  taxes  as an important
source  of revenue,  largtly  because  of their  administrative  advantages. Trade
tariffs,  however,  have  important  economic  costs,  particularly  with  respect  to
the  production  of tradable  goods. While  in  the  short  run some  countries  may
have  no alternative  to trade  taxes,  as economic  and  administrative  conditions
change  it is important  to  reassess  the  necessity  of trade  taxes.
2.  In addition  to  raising  revenue,  tax  policy  is also  an instrument
of protection.  The  joint  effect  of  domestic  taxes  and  trade  taxes  determine
the  level  of protection  as  well as revenues. Liberalization  will  generally
require  reform  of domestic  taxes  alongside  the  reform  of trade  taxes.
3.  By discouraging  exports,  export  taxes  are  likely  to  do more  harm
than  gook  They  should  be used  only  selectively  and  phased  out  completely  as
the  tax  base  broadens.- 19  -
Table  3.  Developing  Country  Power  Tariffs,  1982
Percent  Difference
of Industrial  Tariffs b











Sierra  Leone  7
Solomon  Islands  14
Sri  Lanka  81
St.  Lucia  14
Thailand  20
Tunisia  20
Yemen,  P.D.R.  98
a/  Unweighted  average  of  commercial,  small  industry,  and  large  industry  when
all  data  available.
b/  Unweighted  average  of low  and  high  domestic  tariffs.
Source: World  Bank  data.- 20 -
4.  Special  export  incentives  can  be helpful  in  promoting  exports,
especially  during  the  early  stages  of trade  policy  reform,  as long  as they  do
not  divert  attention  from  other  important  elements  of trade  liberalization  and
do  not  draw  retaliatory  measures  from  trading  partners. Export  incentives
need  speedy  and  effective  administration  to be successful.
5.  Increasing  the  role  of user  charges,  while  ensuring  that
industrial  users  are  not  inappropriately  taxed,  can  help improve  the
international  competitiveness  of domestic  industries.
Public  Expenditure  Policy
Public  finance  and trade  economists  have traditionally  focused  most
of their  attention  on the  revenue  side  of the  government  budget,  especially  on
tax  and  tariff  policy,  respectively.  They  have  given  much  less  consideration
to the  level  and  composition  of public  spending  as a determinant  of
development  and  trade. At  the  aggregate  level,  some  analysis  has  been  carried
o"t  on the  patterns  and trends  in  government  spending  (83. The relationship
between  level  and  composition  of public  spending  and  the  rate  of economic
growth  has  also  been  investigated  recently  (3]  (13]  [181  (19],  but this
research  on balance  has  remained  inconclusive  about  whether  larger  or more
rapidly  growing  government  spending  will  be beneficial  or  harmful  to  economic
growth. The  World  Bank  carries  out  public  expenditure  reviews  as part  of its
mandate  to assist  developing  country  governments.  These  reviews  have
generally  involved  an assessment  of the  level  and  pattern  of  government
spending  in a particular  country  in  view  of macroeconomic  and  revenue
constraints,  as well  as of sectoral  conditions  and  priorities.  2/  Finally,
public  project  analysis  has  made  allowance  for  distortions  caused  by trade- 21 -
policies  through  the  use  of shadow  prices. However,  none  of these  studies  or
approaches  appears  to  have  addressed  specifically  the  relationship  between
public  spending,  trade  and  development.  The  following  paragraphs  therefore
endeavor  only  to make  some  exploratory  observations.
The  relationship  between  public  expenditures,  trade  and  development
is  complex  for  two  reasons: First,  public  spending,  even  where  notionally  in
support  of tradables  production,  may  be misdirected  or counter-productive  if
it provides  the  wrong  incentives  to producers  or traders  (e.g.,  inefficient
food  subsidies),  if it  displaces  more  efficient  private  activities,  or if it
is  poorly  planned  and  implemented.  e3ccond,  public  spending  often  is  directed
primarily  at the  production  of non-tradables,  such  as power,  irrigation,
transport,  telecommunication,  education  and  health. However,  these  serve  as
essential  inputs  to the  production  of tradables. Bottlenecks  in
infrastructure  can  act  as a serious  brake  on the  growth  of trade  and  on
development  of a countr;. For these  reasons,  caution  is in  order  when
assessing  the  relationship  between  public  spending,  trade  and  development.
The  first  issue  that  needs  to  be addressed  concerns  the  appropriate
role  of  government. Direct  involvement  by governments  or state-owned
enterprises  in  the  production  and  marketing  of agricult.u-al  and  industrial
commodities  has  generally  not  been  successful  [24]  (26]. Instead,  governments
in  developing  countries  are  better  equipped  to devote  their  limited  fiscal  and
administrative  resources  to  ensure  that  the  legal  and  incentive  environment  is
supportive  of private  or  market-based  production  and trade  in  agriculture  and
industry,  and  that  the  necessary  infrastructure  is  available  for  tradables
production.- 22 -
In the  agricultural  sector,  irrigation,  road  and  power
infrastructure,  as well  as research  and  extension  services  provide  particular
examples  of where  public  spending  can  be effectively  directed  in support  of
greater  tradables  production.  The  main  issues  relate  to (a)  the  appropriate
rate  of expansion  of these  systems,  (b)  the  balance  between  investments  in
production  and  distribution,  (c)  the  balance  between  new  investments  and  more
spending  for  operations  and  maintenance,  (d)  the  operational  efficiency  of the
systems,  and (e)  the  balance  between  public  and  private  responsibility  for
these  functions.  With  the  benefit  of hindsight,  it  appears  that  public
spending  on rural  infrastructure  in  developing  countries  has  often  been
misdirected  or  has  unnecessarily  displaced  private  initiative,  has
inappropriately  favored  primary  production  over  distribution  or secondary
access  systems,  and  has  tended  to neglect  operations  and  maintenance  in favor
of new  investments.  3  As a result,  the  infrastructure  necessary  for
expanding  agricultural  'xports  or efficient  import  substitution  has  often
suffered.
In  the  industrial  sector,  infrastructure  plays  a similarly  important
role  in support  of tradables.  The  availability  of uninterrupted  water  and
power  supplies,  access  to  efficient  transport,  telecommunications  and  port
services,  and  availability  of a  well-trained  labor  force  are  all  important
factors  determining  the  productivity  and  competitiveness  of domestic
industry. As in the  case  of agricultural  infrastructure,  issues  arise  as
regards  the  balance  among  different  types  of investment,  operations  and
maintenance,  etc. The  fact  that  much  of the  infrastructure  requirements  arise
in the  context  of  rapid  urbanization  gives  rise  to special  problems,  such  as- 23 -
congestion,  pollution,  and  lack  of financial  and  administrative  resources  to
provide  the  needed  industricl  and  residential  infrastructure.
The  implications  of these  shortcomings  for  the  competitivencss  of
developing  countries  in  the  trade  of  manufactures  are  not  easily  quantified.
However,  some  examples  can  be  given: In  Nigeria,  industrial  firms  are  forced
to  devote  as  much  as 20 percent  of their  initial  capital  outlays  for  electric
generators  and  water  boreholes,  since  public  utilities  are inaccessible  or
unreliable  (28]. For the  ASEAN  countries  it  has  been  estimated  that  a savings
of some  1.2  billion  US dollars  per  year  in shipping  costs  would  be possible,
if  container  berth  productivities  in  ASEAN  ports  could  be raised  to  levels
equivalent  to  those  in  Singapore  [171. Improvements  in port  handling  and
shipping  in  Indonesia  are  estimated  to  have  reduced  port  handling  and  shipping
costs  by  as much  as 30-40  percent  in  recent  years  (4].
A particular  example  of public  investment  in support  of export
activities  involves  the,  case  of export  development  zones  or free  trade  zones--
special  zones,  where  export  producers  are  supplied  with  the  necessary
infrastructure  and  with  unencumbered  access  to international  markets. These
have  been  popular  in some  developing  countries,  especially  in  East  and  South
East  Asia,  as a shortcut  to stimulate  exports  in  an environment  where  the
physical,  financial  and  institutional  infrastructure  in support  of exports  is
weak. A recent  evaluation  of the  East  and  South-East  Asian  experience  [41
concludes  that  such  zones  are  most successful,  where,  as in  the  case  of Korea,
they  are  only  one  part  of a broader  set  of export  development  policies,  rather
than  the  main  export  development  instrument,  as was  the  case  in  Malaysia,
Philippines  or Thailand. Cost-benefit  analysis  of public  spending  on free- 24 -
trade  zones  in  Malaysia  reinforces  the  scepticism  with  which  such  programs
should  be  viewed  as  a mainstay  of an export  development  strategy.
In  many  developing  countries  expenditures  have  had  to be cut  back  in
recent  years  in  response  to severe  fiscal  crises. The  available  data  indicate
that  these  cut-backs  tended  to  fall  most  heavily  on capital  spending,
especially  in the  infrastructure  sectors,  while  interest  payments  rapidly
increased  and  defense  spending  declined  only  modestly. Spending  cut-backs  in
other  areas,  such  as productive  and  social  services,  tended  to fall  between
these  extremes  [91. While  such  cutbacks  have  often  been  a necessary  and
appropriate  response  to fiscal  crisis  and  to  earlier  overexpansion,  in  many
cases  these  reductions  have  probably  also  hindered  the  flexibility  of
developing  countries  in  responding  to improved  international  trading
opportunities.  In the  case  of the  Philippines,  for  example,  the  deterioration
of the  country's  infrastructure,  due  to cutbacks  in  essential  maintenance  and
rehabilitation  during  tWe  mid-1980s,  is  likely  to  have  posed  an obstacle  to a
revival  of exports  (4].
Sound  public  expenditure  management  can  only  complement,  not
substitute  for  efficient  incentives  to private  producers  and  consumers. At
the  same  time,  inappropriate  tax  and  regulatory  policies  can  make  public
expenditure  programs  ineffective  or even  counterproductive.  For  example,
where  the  needs  of  protected  and inefficient  import  substitution  industries
drive  complementary  public  investment  decisions,  the  resulting  infrastructure
investments  are  also inefficient  and  may  well  be  wasted  after  liberalization
of the  tariff  structure  is carried  out.
Four  main  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  this  brief  review  of public
spending  experience  in  developing  countries. First,  while  state  participation- 25  -
in industrial  and  agricultural  production  is  not  generally  desirable,
effective  public  spending  allocation  in the  areas  of physical  infrastructure
and  human  resources  clearly  has  an important  role  to play. It will  help
ensure  (a)  that  tradables  production  in  developing  countries  can  grow,  (b)
that  developing  countries  can  respond  flexibly  to changing  international
trading  opportunities,  and (c)  that  they  can  deal  with  major  fiscal  crises
without  endangering  their  long  term  trade  and  development  opportunities.
Second,  there  exists  no substitute  for  careful  and  effective  implementation  of
public  spending  programs. Third,  public  spending  can  only  complement,  not
substitute  for  effective  incentives  to  private  producers  and  traders.
Conclusion
In  discussing  trade  and  public  finance  policies,  the  many intricate
relations  between  the  two  policy  areas  need  to be explicitly  considered.
Failure  to  do so  will  1.kely  lead  to inconsistent  and  unsustainable  policies,
thus  hindering  a country's  trade  and  development  prospects.  The following
specific  conclusions  are  of particular  importance.
O  A competitive  real  e2.change  rate,  improved  trade  performance,  and
trade  liberalization  are  all  built  on the  base  of sound  fiscal  management.
Trade  policies  and  trade  liberalization,  however,  may  have  a negative  impact
on fiscal  balances,  which  must  be considered  and  compensated  for.
O  Improving  competitiveness  and  reducing  protection  is likely  to involve
reforms  of both  trade  tariffs  and  domestic  taxation. Greater  reliance  on
efficiently  designed  user  charges  will  also  help strengthen  a country's
international  competitiveness.
o  Correct  priorities  should  be set  for  public  expenditures  (whether
they  are  rising  or falling)  to  ensure  that  they  are supportive  of trade  and  of
tradable  goods  production.Footnotes
*  The  authors  are  at the  World  Bank  and  at Saint  Anbny's  College,  Oxford
University,  respectively.  They  were  members  of the  team  that  prepared
World  Development  Report  1988 (281. Unless  otherwise  stated,  the  data
cited  in  the  paper  are  based  on that  report. The  authors  gratefully
acknowledge  the  comments  of Jurgen  Backhaus,  Bela  Balassa,  Stanley  Fischer
and  Kurt  Schmidt. However,  the  views  expressed  in this  paper  are  those  of
the  authors,  and  do not  necessarily  reflect  those  of the  World  Bank  or its
member  countries.
1/ Devaluations  in themselves  will  have  a fiscal  effect  because  they  revalue
foreign  currency  income  and  expenditure  in domestic  currency. The degree
of fiscal  adjustment  needed  to  achieve  a given  reduction  in  the  budget
deficit  will  vary  according  to the  extent  to  which  the  public  sector  is  a
net  earner  of foreign  exchange  [28].
21  See  (28],  Box  5.10  for  a description  of the  World  Bank  approach  to  public
expenditure  reviews. Recent  World  Development  Reports  have  drawn  on these
reviews  for  assessing  the  appropriate  role  of public  spending  in selected
sectors  such  as agriculture  [221,  industry  (26],  and  education,  health  and
infrastructure  (281. [23]  provides  a country  example  of a public
expenditure  review  for  the  case  of Thailand.
31  For  examples  and  further  documentation  see (231  and [24]. A particularly
dramatic  case  is that  of the  road  sector,  where  lack  of  an appropriate
balance  between  new investments  and  maintenance  has  led  to  a serious
misallocation  of public  resources  and  impediments  to agricultural
production  and  trade  [27].References
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